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I. INTRODUCTION
ABC Corporation employs fifty drivers and transports various
products across state lines. An employee of ABC corporation secretly
carries small amounts of illegal drugs in the trailers of the trucks he
drives and does so without detection for five years. After law enforce-
ment authorities discover the drug trafficking, the United States files
an in rem action under 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(4), seeking forfeiture
of every truck that the guilty driver drove over the past five years and
1. This statute provides for the forfeiture of "[a]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehi-
cles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled substances,




every trailer in which the guilty driver carried drugs. This forfeiture
could result in ABC Corporation's losing a third of its trucks and
trailers because it rotates its drivers among trucks and each truck
pulls a different trailer on each trip. ABC Corporation plans to
challenge the forfeiture under the Excessive Fines Clause.
2
Meanwhile, the government is also seeking the forfeiture of
some of the driver's property, his home3 where he had stored the
drugs, and his car in which he had brought the drugs to work. The
driver also plans to challenge the forfeiture as excessive under the
Eighth Amendment. Both ABC Corporation and the driver assert
that the forfeitures are excessive. As an individual, the driver has
eighth amendment rights and may prevail on his claim. As a
corporation, ABC Corporation might not have such rights.
In another hypothetical, the State of New York seeks $250
million in punitive damages from a common law public nuisance claim
against a corporation responsible for an environmental disaster in
New York.4 The corporation claims that imposing punitive damages
above the maximum criminal fine of $2,000 per offense violates the
Excessive Fines Clause. While the Eighth Amendment would apply to
punitive damages awards paid to the sovereign if the defendant were
an individual,5 the defendant's status as a corporation raises doubt as
to whether the Eighth Amendment offers it protection from any fine.
These hypotheticals demonstrate the practical issues sur-
rounding the Eighth Amendment. In recent years, the meaning and
application of the Excessive Fines Clause has become a topic of
increased interest because of the controversy over the consti-
tutionality of large punitive damages awards. In Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,6 the Supreme Court
2. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const., Amend. VIII.
3. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) authorizes the seizure of real property that is used "to commit, or
to facilitate the commission of, a violation of [federal drug laws] punishable by more than one
year's imprisonment...."
4. The facts of this hypothetical are based on those in United States v. Hooker Chemicals
& Plastics Corp., where the state of New York sought $250 million in punitive damages on a
common law public nuisance claim for Occidental Chemical Corporation's role in the Love Canal
environmental disaster. 748 F. Supp. 67, 68 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)
5. In Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), the Court held that payments to the
sovereign as punishments are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 622. Austin
involved a civil forfeiture rather than punitive damages. Id. at 604.
6. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). Prior to Browning, the controversy over large punitive damage
awards was phrased in terms of constitutional limits. See Richard B. Graves III, Comment,
Bad-Faith Denial of Insurance Claims: Whose Faith, Whose Punishment? An Examination of
Punitive Damages and Vicarious Liability, 65 Tulane L. Rev. 395, 402 (1990) (stating that the
defense bar hopes for a constitutional limit on punitive damages); Stephen Daniels and Joanne
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held that the Eighth Amendment only applies to fines imposed and
received by the government, not to punitive damages awards between
private parties.7 The Court has also held that the Excessive Fines
Clause protects against excessive civil forfeitures.8 However, the
Court has not answered whether the Eighth Amendment protects
corporate defendants s  This open question retains importance
because, as the hypotheticals indicate, corporations are subject to
government prosecutions, both criminal and civil. 10
Although the Supreme Court explicitly has left the question of
the Eighth Amendment's applicability to corporations unanswered,"
it has decided that corporations receive some Bill of Rights protec-
tions.12 Part II of this Note discusses these protections as well as the
protections not extended to corporations. This discussion shows that
the Court has never adopted a consistent approach to recognizing a
corporation's constitutional rights, but recently has focused on the
purpose, history, and nature of the amendment at issue.
Part III establishes the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause
by examining its history and how the courts have applied it. 3
Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 6-27 (1990) (discussing the
legal debate surrounding punitive damages). Advocates of a constitutional limit asserted that
the Excessive Fines Clause applied to civil penal sanctions as well as criminal penalties. See,
for example, Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some
Lessons from History, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1233, 1271 (1987); Lyndon F. Bittle, Comment, Punitive
Damages and the Eighth Amendmentk An Analytical Framework for Determining Excessiveness,
75 Cal. L. Rev. 1433, 1470-71 (1987); Andrew M. Kenefick, Note, The Constitutionality of
Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 Mich. L. Rev.
1699, 1700 (1987) (stating that "a fine that is constitutionally excessive in a criminal setting is
no less excessive in a civil setting"). Both authors supported their argument by examining the
history of the Excessive Fines Clause. See, for example, Massey, 40 Vand. L. Rev. at 1240-69
(cited in this note) (discussing the history of the Eighth Amendment); Kenefick, 85 Mich. L. Rev.
at 1714-19 (cited in this note).
7. Browning, 492 U.S. at 268, 271.
8. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
9. Browning, 492 U.S. at 276 n.22.
10. Prior to Austin, cases had implied that the Eighth Amendment only applied to crimi-
nal actions. Browning, 492 U.S. at 262; Laura Larose, Comment, Austin v. United States:
Applicability of the Eighth Amendment to Civil In Rem Forfeitures, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 729,
743, 755 (1995). Austin established that the Eighth Amendment applies to actions by the
government which punish in both criminal and civil cases. 509 U.S. at 610 (holding that the
Eighth Amendment applies to civil forfeitures).
11. Browning, 492 U.S. at 276 n.22.
12. Corporations receive the following protections: Fifth Amendment (Takings Clause,
Double Jeopardy); Seventh Amendment (civil jury); Fourth Amendment (Warrants Clause);
First Amendment (political speech, commercial speech, negative speech). See Part II.
13. At issue is whether the Eighth Amendment applies to corporations. However, since
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only prevents the state from imposing physically or
mentally cruel penalties, it has little relevance for corporations. The real concern for corpo-
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Although little direct evidence on the meaning of the clause exists,
history and the courts indicate that it requires fines to be
proportionate to the harm committed. Part III also examines how the
courts have handled eighth amendment issues when raised by
corporations in the early twentieth century at the Supreme Court
level and more recently at the lower court level. While no court has
stated that corporations receive eighth amendment rights, courts
have provided similar protection indirectly, which suggests that the
Eighth Amendment is an appropriate protection for corporations.
Part IV applies the Court's most recent method for deciding
which amendments apply to corporations. This analysis draws on the
history and purpose of the Eighth Amendment. Part IV also ad-
dresses policy arguments for and against applying the Amendment to
corporations. Part V addresses practical considerations that arise
when adjudicating cases involving corporations.
Applying bill of rights protections to fictional entities can raise
fears of erasing the importance of the Bill of Rights as a bastion of
individual liberty.14 While this concern is valid, whether individual
liberties are being usurped by corporations depends on the nature of
the amendment at issue. 15 This Note demonstrates that the Eighth
Amendment centers around protecting property rights rather than
personal rights, and therefore its extension does not threaten
individual liberties. 16  The Eighth Amendment does not implicate
policy concerns that surround extending other bill of rights
protections to corporations. Rather, it fits squarely within the Court's
precedent for extending rights to corporations.
rations is receiving a fine disproportionate to the crime committed. Thus, this Note focuses on
the Excessive Fines Clause.
14. Some commentators argue that granting corporations constitutional rights will un-
leash "corporate giants" and allow them to swallow individual rights the same way they have
overwhelmed individually owned "mom and pop" businesses. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing
the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 Hastings L. J. 577, 658 (1989-90)
(arguing that granting rights to corporations is a zero sum game; the more rights corporations
can assert, the less rights individuals will hold).
15. See Part IV.B.
16 The Supreme Court has described the rights denied to corporations as "purely per-




II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS CURRENTLY RECOGNIZED AS
BELONGING TO CORPORATIONS
The Supreme Court has not approached the question of which
rights apply to corporations with a consistent line of reasoning.
Rather, theories of corporate personhood have changed through the
years with the Court playing a role in their evolution. The Court has
followed a trend of extending rights to corporations, but it has not
agreed to a wholesale application of the bill of rights protections to
corporate entities. Instead of granting blanket protection, the Court
has approached amendments separately and has used different
reasoning in applying them to corporations. Some lower courts have
remained steadfast in denying fundamental rights to corporations.17
In 1886, the Court in Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific
Railroad, Co.18 unanimously granted corporations a unique status by
deeming them persons under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. It did so without hearing argument on the issue
and without explaining its conclusion.9 The Court soon extended this
holding to the Due Process Clause.2o
In hindsight, Santa Clara stands as a landmark decision.21
Modern jurisprudence on the rights of corporations and their impor-
tance in American society has made Santa Clara seem significant,
since it started the inquiry into the legal status of corporations under
the Constitution. In 1886 and the years immediately following,
however, several factors limited the original importance of Santa
Clara.
First, the Court decided Santa Clara at a time when the
Fourteenth Amendment did not provide a high level of protection.22
Today the Equal Protection Clause provides extensive protection
against discrimination by requiring the state to demonstrate height-
ened or compelling justifications for its actions. However, in 1886, the
Court did not require close scrutiny to pass the Equal Protection
17. National Paint & Coatings Assoc. v. Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1995).
18. 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
19. Chief Justice Waite wrote: "The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State
to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these
Corporations. We are all of opinion that it does." Id. at 396.
20. Synyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898).
21. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 Geo.




Clause,23 nor had it begun to incorporate the Bill of Rights through
the Fourteenth Amendment.24 Thus, stating that corporations were
persons under the Equal Protection Clause did not have ground-
breaking repercussions at the time of the decision.
Second, the Santa Clara Court did not base its holding on a
theory of corporate personhood that was conducive to extending
corporations many other rights. Instead, the Court viewed
corporations as aggregations of natural individuals without a separate
existence from them.25 The lawyer for the corporation in Santa Clara
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the property rights
of the shareholders who joined to form a corporation, not of some
separate entity.26 This argument was a response to the traditional
corporate theory which viewed corporations as artificial entities
created by the states and beholden to their state-granted charters for
any rights they had.27 The corporation in Santa Clara wanted the
Court to view corporations as a business form little different from
partnerships, 2 8  and therefore to grant corporations the same
protections enjoyed by individuals in partnerships.
While this argument, known as the aggregate theory, served
the immediate ends of the corporation in Santa Clara, viewing corpo-
rations as aggregations limited what rights corporations could re-
ceive.29 Under this theory, corporations receive only the rights neces-
sary to protect the property rights of their shareholders.30  Thus,
Santa Clara's enunciation of corporate personhood solved the problem
of guaranteeing the property rights of shareholders without requiring
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited. The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 178 (1985-86).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 181.
28. Id. at 204.
29. Id. at 182.
30. Id. at 177, 182. However, the aggregate theory can be used to extend corporations
more than property rights. Justice Scalia used the theory in his dissent in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990). See also Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corporate
Legal Theory Under the First Amendment: Belotti and Austin, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 317, 358-60
(1991). The Austin majority opinion allowed states to limit corporate expenditures to political
candidates. Austin, 494 U.S. at 654. Scalia viewed the holding as a violation of the first
amendment rights of the persons who voluntarily associate as a corporation. Id. at 680. Scalia
saw no distinction in regulating the political expenditures of a corporation or an individual. Id.
at 680 (stating that the amassing of large amounts of capital is not a sufficient justification for
limiting the rights of associations of persons unless it is constitutional to prevent individuals of
certain affluence from endorsing candidates).
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each shareholder to litigate individually,31 but did not establish
corporations as entities with rights separate from their shareholders.
Santa Clara's limitations became more evident when the
rights at issue were intangible. In later cases, the Court remained
consistent with its holding in Santa Clara by limiting the rights
corporations received to those essential for the protection of
shareholder property rights even as it relied on different theories of
corporate personhood. In Smyth v. Ames,32 the Court recognized that
corporations receive protection from takings without due process of
law under the Fifth Amendment. Repeatedly, the Court made clear
that corporations are not considered citizens under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 The Court
denied corporations the privilege against self-incrimination in Hale v.
Henkel,34 and fourth amendment rights to privacy in United States v.
Morton Salt Co.35 by relying on the artificial entity theory. The Court
based both holdings on the differences between artificial and natural
persons.36 However, the Hale Court also used the natural entity
theory. This theory views corporations as separate from their
shareholders and indebted for their creation to private initiative
rather than state charters3 7 In a part of the opinion discussing
privacy rights, the Court referred to a corporation as "a distinct legal
entity" that "[iun organizing itself as a collective body waives no
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body."
38
31. Hovenkamp, 76 Georgetown L. J. at 1641 (cited in note 21).
32. 169 U.S. 466, 522-23 (1898).
33. See, for example, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939). This line of authority would
have allowed a state to discriminate against out-of-state corporations. However, this "foreign
corporations" doctrine later unraveled when the Court held that a corporation was a person
within the jurisdiction and could not be expelled arbitrarily. Hovenkamp, 76 Geo. L. J. at 1650
(cited in note 21).
34. 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906). See also Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376 (1911).
35. 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950).
36. Id. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74. In Hale, the Court referred to the "clear distinction between
individuals and corporations: While an individual "owes nothing to the public so long as he does
not trespass upon their rights," and thus has rights including the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, a "corporation is a creature of the state," presumed to have incorporated for the benefit
of the public with privileges limited by state law and its corporate charter. Id. at 74. "Its rights
to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation." Id. at
74-75. Likewise, the Morton Salt Court emphasized that states grant corporate rights. 338 U.S.
at 652. Thus, corporations could "claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right
to privacy." Id.
37. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L. J. 201, 211.
38. Hale, 201 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added). The Hale Court's privacy rights holding was
later limited by the Morton Salt Court's denial of privacy rights.
1996] 1319
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The natural entity theory favors extending rights to corpora-
tions, since along with recognizing the separate existence of the cor-
poration from its shareholders, it recognizes that corporations have
independent rights.39 Despite this potential for granting corporations
broad constitutional rights, the theory has limitations. It still
preserves some distinctions between individuals and corporations,
40
and it takes a middle road between respecting the power of the state
to regulate and recognizing the initiative of individuals to form
corporations. 41 Thus, the natural entity theory provides the basis for
extending rights to the corporate entity itself but also may be used to
deny corporations rights enjoyed by individuals.
After 1960, the Court stopped pondering expressly the nature
of corporate personhood and began focusing on the amendment at
issue.42 The Court used this new approach in United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co. 43 to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to
corporations." The Martin Linen Court focused on the policies of the
Fifth Amendment 45 when deciding to recognize double jeopardy
protection for corporations.46 It stated that the Double Jeopardy
Clause is designed to prevent the government from repeatedly trying
to convict a person, thereby subjecting that person to embarrassment,
great expense, and the ordeal of living through the insecurity of facing
a conviction.47 The Court did not explain how applying the Clause to
corporations would fulfill these purposes. 48 Rather, it apparently
assumed that applying double jeopardy to corporations accomplishes
these goals.
In Ross v. Bernhard,49 when deciding that the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial for suits at common law applies to
corporations, the Court explicitly relied on the history of the
amendment rather than corporate theories.50 After dismissing the
relevance of using an entity or aggregate theory,51 the Court found
39. Mayer, 41 Hastings L. J. at 580-81 (cited in note 14).
40. Watts, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. at 363 (cited in note 30).
41. Id. at 372.
42. Mayer, 41 Hastings L. J. at 620-21 (cited in note 14).
43. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
44. Id. at 565, 575.
45. Mayer, 41 Hastings L. J. at 635 (cited in note 14).
46. Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 565, 575.
47. Id. at 569.
48. Mayer, 41 Hastings L. J. at 634 (cited in note 14).
49. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
50. Id. at 533-34. The issue concerned whether the Seventh Amendment applies to
shareholder derivative actions. Id. at 531.
51. Id. at 531.
1320 [Vol. 49:1313
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that "a corporation's suit to enforce a legal right was an action at
common law carrying the right to jury trial at the time the Seventh
Amendment was adopted."
5 2
Similarly, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.53 the Court relied on
the history of the amendment as it considered the applicability of the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment to corporations. The
Marshall Court held that the Clause required government inspectors
to have a warrant before entering a commercial building.
54 It
interpreted the history of the Fourth Amendment as demonstrating
that the Founders were concerned with general warrants, which
especially affected merchants and businessmen. 55 Thus, a corporation
received protection from warrantless searches.
56
In first amendment cases involving corporations, the Court has
focused on the type of expression involved rather than the identity of
the speaker. In First National Bank v. Bellotti,57 the Court refused to
ask whether corporations have first amendment rights. Instead, it
asked whether the statute at issue "abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect."S5 The Court discussed the
importance of the speech at issue and found that it involved matters
of public concern at the heart of the First Amendment.59 The
corporate identity of the speaker did not change the fact that the
expression at issue was "indispensable" to decision-making in a
democracy.6 0
Further, the Bellotti Court denied that corporate identity de-
termines which amendments apply to corporations. 61  It explained
52. Id.
53. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
54. Id. at 311.
55. Id. The Court noted that this guarantee did not apply to all industries, since excep-
tions would be made for industries with such a history of government oversight that the indus-
try had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 313-14.
56. Id. at 311.
57. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
58 Id. at 776.
59 Id.
60. Id. at 777.
61. Id. at 778 n.14. The Court's jurisprudence on the first amendment rights of corpo-
rations could be viewed as having no bearing on whether other amendments apply because of
the general first amendment practice of focusing on the content of the speech rather than the
identity of the speaker. However, some members of the Court have viewed the corporate
identity of the speaker as determinative. Justice Marshall denied that corporations have free
speech rights coextensive with those of individuals. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. California
Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 25 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). Chief Justice
Rehnquist has also disagreed with extending free speech rights if such rights go beyond promot-
ing a broad forum to ascribing minds to artificial entities. Id. at 33 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
1996] 1321
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that earlier decisions had denied corporations the privilege against
self-incrimination and privacy because of the history behind these
amendments.62 The Court opined that whether bill of rights guaran-
tees apply to corporations depends on the "nature, history, and pur-
pose of the particular constitutional provision."63
The Court continued this line of reasoning when it used a case
involving a corporation to establish the test for protection given to
commercial speech.6 4 Courts have applied this test, which is based on
the distinction between commercial speech and political speech,65
numerous times since its creation without developing a separate
analysis for natural persons as speakers. 66
The Court reemphasized its methodology of ignoring corporate
identity when it extended negative speech rights to corporations in
Pacific Gas v. California Public Utilities Commission.67 In Pacific
Gas, a private utility company included newsletters in its billing
envelopes.68 The California Public Utilities Commission attempted to
require the company to include material issued by a ratemaking
interest group in their billing envelopes.69 The Court stated, "[flor
corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it
the choice of what not to say."70 It reasoned that the main issue in
first amendment cases involving corporations is whether the state has
attempted to regulate speech which the First Amendment was
designed to protect.71 Having found that a corporation's newsletter
dissenting). Further, the Bellotti majority attempted to reconcile its holding with other
decisions on Bill of Rights protections applying to corporations. 435 U.S. at 778-79, n.14. Thus,
the Court was not merely applying its classic First Amendment analysis in reaching its holdings
on the Amendment's application to corporations.
62. The Court stated that "'purely personar guarantees, such as the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because
the 'historic function' of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individu-
als." Belotti, 435 U.S. at 778-79 n.14.
63. Id.
64. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
65. Id. at 562.
66. See, for example, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); City of
Cincinatti v. Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.
Ct. 2371, 132 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1995); Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
67. 475 U.S. at 8. "And we have held that speech does not lose its protection because of
the corporate identity of the speaker." Id. at 16 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777).
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 4-7.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 8. The Pacific Gas Court feared that the regulation at issue would lead to self-
censorship, which would impinge on the purpose of the First Amendment by reducing the flow
of information. Id. at 14.
1322 [Vol. 49:1313
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was protected speech,72 the Court held that the regulation at issue
violated the First Amendment. 73
Thus, the Court's recent jurisprudence has disregarded the
express use of corporate personhood theories when deciding which bill
of rights guarantees apply to corporations.74 The Court has instead
looked to the "nature, history, and purpose" of the amendment at
issue. However, this view has not commanded the unanimous
support of the Court, as demonstrated by the dissents in Bellotti and
Pacific Gas.
In Bellotti, Justice White and three other justices dissented in
an opinion that considered the identity of the speaker when determin-
ing whether corporations have first amendment political speech
rights.75 Justice White's reasoning mirrored the aggregate theory by
its emphasis on the individual's free speech rights implicated in
corporate-sponsored communication.76
Then-Justice Rehnquist's separate dissent in Bellotti expressly
invoked the Court's earlier corporate theory jurisprudence. 77 Justice
Rehnquist viewed the correct inquiry as whether the constitutional
protection is essential to the very existence of the corporation. 78
72. Id. at 8.
73. Id. at 21.
74. The Courts decisions can be interpreted as resting on various corporate theories, but
the Court has not engaged in a forthright discussion of its view of corporate personhood. See
Watts, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. at 348 (cited in note 30) (stating that while the Bellotti court
avoided discussing corporate theories, it appeared to use the natural entity theory). Watts
argues that the Court should expressly rely on corporate theories as a means to clarify the
different outcomes it reaches in deciding which rights corporations receive. Id. at 339.
75. Justice White opined that corporate speech is subject to regulation that individual
speech is not. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 805. He defined the functions of the First Amendment as
furthering self-expression and self-fulfillment and protecting the interchange of ideas. Id. at
804-05. He found these functions absent in the context of a corporate speaker. Id. at 806, 808.
76. Justice White characterized the speech at issue as a "managerial decision," and
focused on whether the self-expression and fulfillment of shareholders were affected by a
corporation's contributions to political causes. Id. at 803, 806.
77. Then-Justice Rehnquist recited the early precedent that the Fourteenth Amendmenes
protection of liberty belongs to persons, not corporations. Id. at 822. He also quoted with
approval Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheaton) 518, 636 (1819):
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contem-
plation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very exis-
tence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it
was created.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 823. Justice Rehnquist also stated that corporations should be subject to
special regulation just as they receive special privileges different from those of individuals. Id.
at 827.
78. Id. at 824.
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Justice Rehnquist argued that while the protection against takings of
corporate property without due process of law is incidental to
corporate existence, 79 political speech is not.80
Justice Rehnquist continued to use this approach in his Pacific
Gas dissent, stating that treating individuals and corporations
identically for constitutional purposes is "a jurisprudential sin."81 He
accused the majority of ascribing minds to artificial entities by
extending negative speech rights to corporations.8 2 Justice Rehnquist
stated that negative speech rights derive from the interest of natural
persons in self-expression and are part of the interest of natural
persons in freedom of conscience.8 3  In contrast, he thought that
corporate free speech rights arise from the first amendment interest
in promoting a broad forum for political discussion. 4 Thus, Justice
Rehnquist denied that corporations had negative speech rights.85
Justice Rehnquist's method is not without followers.86 While
his use of corporate identity theory to determine what constitutional
protections apply to corporations has not attracted other members of
the Court,87 a complete discussion of whether the Eighth Amendment
applies to corporations must include considerations of the
methodologies historically employed by the Court. The main focus
should remain, however, on an inquiry into the history of the Eighth
Amendment, the purposes of the Framers, and the practical issues in
applying the amendment.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 828.
81. 475U.Sat 35.
82. Id. at 33.
83. Id. at 32.
84. Id. at 33.
85. Id. at 35.
86. Critics of the Pacific Gas holding have phrased their criticism in terms similar to
Justice Rehnquist's. For example, Mitchell C. Tilner maintains that corporations cannot
meaningfully enjoy a freedom of conscience because they are "inanimate entities." Mitchell C.
Tilner, Government Compulsion of Corporate Speech: Legitimate Regulation or First
Amendment Violation? A Critique of PG & E v. Public Utilities Commission, 27 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 485, 498 (1987). Tilner cites Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 534, an artificial
entity decision (see note 77), and Justice Rehnquist's Pacific Gas dissent. Tilner, Government
Compulsion of Corporate Speech at 503-04.
87. See Watts, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. at 362-63 (cited in note 30) (observing that no current
justice has joined Rehnquist's reliance on the artificial entity theory). Professor Watts argues,
however, that the Austin v. Michigan majority relies on the natural entity, or aggregate theory,
viewing corporations merely as a group of individuals joined by contract. Id. at 357-60.
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III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
A. The Intent of the Framers
The language of the Eighth Amendment first appeared in
section 10 of the English Bill of Rights in 1689: "[E]xcessive bail
ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."88 The English Bill of Rights sought to
remedy the injustices of the last two Stuart kings.8 9
The American colonists established charters which claimed the
rights of Englishmen. ° As the Revolution developed, the colonists
included provisions in their new constitutions and declarations of
rights that copied the English model.9s The revolutionary leaders
knew English constitutional history,9 2 and thus knew of the restraints
the English people had created to limit governmental power.93
Despite this background, neither a provision on bail, fines, or
punishments, nor a bill of rights, was included in the Constitution
88. Richard Petty, ed., Sources of Our Liberties 247 (American Bar Foundation, 1959).
89. Bernard Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of
Rights 23 (Oxford U., 1977). The Habeus Corpus Act of 1679 was meant to provide relief to
those kept prisoner without trial. William Holdsworth, 6 A History of English Law 214
(Methuen & Co., 1987). The writ of habeas corpus was a traditional method of obtaining the
release of one wrongly imprisoned. Frederic Maitland, The Constitutional History of England
146 (Cambridge U., 1968). The Habeas Corpus Act required the writ to be issued upon any
request to release a prisoner except for those prisoners who faced charges or were convicted of
treason or a felony. Id. Those imprisoned on felony or treason charges had to be tried "at the
following session or the following sessions but one" of the court or receive bail. Id. at 147.
During the reigns of Charles II and James II, judges nullified the Habeus Corpus Act by setting
high bail. Id. at 314-15. The English Revolution of 1688-89 sought to restore the rights the
Stuart kings had trampled. Mark Thomson, A Constitutional History of England, 1648-1801 at
168, 174 (Methuen & Co., 1938).
90. Schwartz, Great Rights at 27 (cited in note 89). The Virginia Charter established the
precedent of stating that the colonists possessed all the rights of Englishmen. Id. The charters
of New England, Massachusetts Bay, Maryland, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Carolina, and
Georgia included similar guarantees. Id.
91. Id. at 67, 72-78; Petty, Sources of Our Liberties at 430 (cited in note 88). Virginia led
the way with its Declaration of Rights in 1776, parts of which used the exact words of the
English Bill of Rights. Schwartz, Great Rights at 67, 70 (cited in note 89). The declarations of
rights of Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, and Massachusetts; the constitutions of
Pennsylvania and Georgia; and the bill of rights of New Hampshire all contained provisions
concerning excessive bail and fines, with some variance on whether a prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments was included. Id. at 90.
92. Robert A. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights 3 (Northeastern U., 1991).
93. Mark Thomson, Constitutional History at 169 (cited in note 89).
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submitted to the states in 1787.94 In the ratification debates, a major
issue was the lack of a bill of rights. 5 As the states began ratifying
the Constitution, some attached proposed amendments.96 Four states
included provisions in their proposed amendments against excessive
fines, bail, and cruel and unusual punishments97
Madison built upon the states' proposals98 for a draft of consti-
tutional amendments that he submitted to the First Congress on June
8, 1789.99 He made one small but significant change to the language
used in the English Bill of Rights and copied by the states in their
declarations of rights and proposed amendments.100 Madison changed
the provision on bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishment from a
recommendation to a requirement. Instead of stating that excessive
bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishments "ought not" be im-
posed, Madison used the definitive words, "shall not."'
The Committee of the Whole considered what eventually be-
came known as the Eighth Amendment on August 17, 1789.102
Madison's language sparked very little debate other than some
concerns over "cruel and unusual punishments" being too indefinite0 3
and unnecessarily broad in defining the types of punishments that
would be banned.O4 The only recorded reference to the Excessive
94. Schwartz, Great Rights at 103 (cited in note 89). Near the end of the Convention,
George Mason proposed that a committee draft a bill of rights, but his motion was easily de-
feated. Id. at 104-05. Charles Pinckney also made an unsuccessful attempt to protect the
freedom of the press and freedom from quartering troops. Id. at 105.
95. Id. at 103-05. For instance, George Mason published his Objections to the
Constitution, which began with the complaint that the Constitution lacked a bill of rights. Id. at
106. For a further discussion of the debate, see id. at 105-18.
96. Pennsylvania was the second state to ratify the Constitution, and an attempt to attach
proposed amendments was defeated. However, the dissenters to ratification widely dissemi-
nated their amendments, which influenced several states that ratified later to attach amend-
ments. Id. at 123-55.
97. The unsuccessful Pennsylvania attempt to add amendments contained provisions on
bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 158. Virginia and New York adopted
amendments with the same provision. Id. at 138, 147, 158. North Carolina did not ratify or
reject the Constitution, but passed a resolution with a declaration of rights that copied the
Virginia model. Id. at 155, 158.
98. Id. at 159. Madison faced the difficult task of choosing among the many state propos-
als, which contained almost one hundred different substantive guarantees. Id. at 157, 159.
99. Id. at 232.
100. Id. at 169.
101. Id. at 169-70.
102. Annals of Congress, 1st Congress vol. 1 at 753 (1789).
103. "Mr. Smith of South Carolina objected to the words, 'nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments,' the import of them being too indefinite." Id.
104. Mr. Livermore of New Hampshire stated,
No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a
man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we
in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a
more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it
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Fines Clause is by Mr. Livermore of New Hampshire who stated,
"What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to
determine."1 5 The record simply states that the amendment was
voted on and "agreed to by a considerable majority."106 Madison's
language was not altered, and Congress passed the Eighth
Amendment on September 25, 1789.107
Despite the apparent consensus in perception that what later
became the Eighth Amendment was a basic liberty, the absence of de-
bate over the Eighth Amendment's language and meaning creates
doubt over the Framers' intent. Yet that silence may also shed light
on its meaning. The lack of debate by Congress and duplication of the
wording of the English Bill of Rights suggests that the Framers con-
sidered the meaning of the clause self-explanatory. The verbatim use
of the English wording along with the colonial claims to the rights of
Englishmen indicates that the English interpretation of the clause is
relevant to discerning intent. In England, the clause had served to
prevent the crown from abusing its powers of prosecution through
arbitrary and excessive punishment.108 By inference, the Framers
intended the Eighth Amendment as an explicit limitation on the
prosecutorial power of the government.
This interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's
recent jurisprudence on applying the Bill of Rights protections to
corporations: the applicability of the Eighth Amendment depends on
whether the government has attempted to impose an excessive fine
rather than the identity of the defendant invoking the Amendment for
protection.
could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we
have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making




107. Schwartz, Great Rights at 232, 236, 240, 244, 246 (cited in note 89).
108. See Thomson, Constitutional History at 169 (cited in note 89) (stating that the English
Revolution in 1688-89 was against arbitrary power).
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B. The Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause in Practice
1. In General
The Supreme Court has twice ruled on the meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause. In Browning, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment in its entirety applies only as a limitation on the
government. 10 9 The Browning Court rejected arguments that the
Eighth Amendment applies to civil jury awards of punitive damages
and found that the Framers intended to limit only those fines that the
government directly imposed and received." 0 The Court reasoned
that unlike when the government shares in the recovery of fines, civil
jury awards of punitive damages do not raise concerns of the
sovereign's oppressing political opponents or raising revenue in unfair
ways."'
In Austin, the Court applied the Excessive Fines Clause to civil
forfeitures, and found that the applicability of the amendment
depends not on whether the sanction is criminal or civil but rather on
whether the government pursues a penalty that is a punishment."
2
Thus, the Excessive Fines Clause only applies when the government
pursues a remedy, but the clause protects defendants regardless of
the type of sanction used.
The Court in Browning noted that it had "never considered an
application of the Excessive Fines Clause.""3 Instead, it had consid-
ered the Eighth Amendment in its entirety.14 The Court has indi-
rectly determined the method for applying the Excessive Fines Clause
by interpreting the Eighth Amendment as placing the same limita-
109. 492 U.S. at 268. The Court stated that Congress did not discuss what it meant by
"fine," but that history shows the word meant a payment to a sovereign. Id. at 264-67. The
history of the clause does not support a conclusion that the clause acts as a limitation on civil
jury awards of punitive damages. Id. at 271.
110. Id. at 268.
111. Id. at 272.
112. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610. The Court concluded that civil forfeitures serve to punish the
owner of the land and are covered by the Eighth Amendment because they are payments to the
government. Id. at 603, 605.
113. 492 U.S. at 262.
114. Id. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has been applied to the states since
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Browning, 492 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor stated there was no reason to distinguish the Excessive Fines
Clause for purposes of incorporation and that she would find that it applied to the states. Id.
Since the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is a small jump in logic to incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause as well.
Massey, 40 Vand. L. Rev. at 1272 (cited in note 6).
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tions on each part of the amendment.115 Thus, the debate surrounding
the application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is also
relevant to discerning the Court's views on the Excessive Fines
Clause.
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has generated
controversy over whether it merely regulates modes of punishments
or also requires sentences proportionate to the crime committed." 6 In
Weems v. United States,"7 the Court held that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause not only prohibits modes of punishment, but also
prohibits excessive punishments." 8 The Court thus decreed that the
prison sentence at issue was cruel and unusual."9
Although Weems could be limited to extraordinary cases, 2 0 the
Court has continued to require a sentence to be proportionate to the
115. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983).
116. For instance, many scholars believe the clause was a response to the cruel methods of
the Bloody Assizes. Anthony Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The
Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 839, 860 (1969). In June 1685, James II crushed the invasion
of the Duke of Monmouth, illegitimate son of the late Charles II and nephew of James II.
Massey, 40 Vand. L.Rev. at 1244 n.62 (cited in note 6). The invasion meant the autumn assizes
were cancelled, but James appointed Chief Justice Lord Jeffreys to travel the western circuit
and capture the rebels. Granucci, 57 Cal. L. Rev. at 843 (cited in this note). Lord Jeffreys
offered plea bargains to the traitors to save time. Id. at 843-44. The traitors pled guilty to avoid
the death penalty, but Lord Jeffreys went back on his word and signed death warrants for 200 of
them. Id. at 844.
One commentator, however, has argued that the Framers misinterpreted the original
meaning behind cruel and unusual punishments in the English Bill of Rights as a ban against
extreme modes of punishment. Id. at 843. Professor Granucci argues that before 1689, a
general principle against excessive punishments existed but not a concern about modes of
punishment. Id. Blackstone described punishments such as beheading, quartering, and
branding as legal. William M. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *291.
For positive evidence of the clause's meaning, Professor Granucci relies on the Titus Oates
affair. A minister named Titus Oates created hysteria in 1678 by proclaiming a Catholic plot to
kill the king. Granucci, 57 Cal. L. Rev. at 852 (cited in this note). Fifteen Catholics were
executed as a result. Id. In 1685, evidence revealed that Oates had lied, and he received a
sentence of life in prison, whippings, pilloring four times a year, defrocking, and a 2,000 mark
fine. Id. at 858. Oates petitioned unsuccessfully for release. Id. Dissenters in Parliament
called the punishment inhumane and unparalleled. Id. at 858-59. They also stated that the
sentences were contrary to the law because a temporal court could not defrock a minister. Id.
Professor Granucci concludes that these objections, plus the continued use of the modes of
punishment imposed on Oates, demonstrates the clause's true meaning. Id. at 860. Cruel and
unusual punishments referred to punishment unauthorized by statute and outside a court's
jurisdiction as well as a reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate penalties. Id.
117. 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 380.
120. Solemn, 463 U.S. at 313 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Weems was working for the United
States government in the Philippines when he was convicted of falsifying an official public
document and received a fifteen year sentence of hard and painful labor chained from ankle to
wrist. In addition, the court deprived him of certain civil privileges, such as disposing of prop-
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crime. 121 For example, in Robinson v. California122 the Court struck
down as cruel and unusual a California statute that prescribed a
prison term for being a narcotic addict, even though a prison term
itself is not a cruel and unusual mode of punishment.
In Solem v. Helm,121 the Court established a three factor test
focusing entirely on proportionality to determine what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. The first factor is the relative gravity
of the offense, determined by a comparison of the circumstances of the
crime with circumstances of similar crimes." 4  The second factor is
the relative harshness of the sentence imposed when compared to
other sentences imposed for similar crimes in the same jurisdiction.125
The third factor is the relative harshness of the sentence imposed
when compared to sentences in other jurisdictions.126
erty inter vivos, subjected him to surveillance during his lifetime, and disqualified him from
ever holding office or voting. Weems, 217 U.S. at 351, 362-64.
121. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284 ("The [Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime commit-
ted.").
122. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). See also Joseph L. Hoffman, The "Cruel and Unusual
Punishment" Clause: A Limit on the Power to Punish or Constitutional Rhetoric, in David J.
Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr., eds., The Bill of Rights in Modern America 139, 149
(Indiana U., 1993).
123. 463 U.S. at 290-93.
124. Id. at 290-91.
125. Id. at 291.
126. Id. at 291-92. Helm had six prior nonviolent felony convictions before being convicted
for writing a "no account check" of $100. Id. at 279, 281. The normal sentence for such a crime
was five years in the state penitentiary and a $5000 fine. Id. at 281. Because of South Dakota's
recidivist statute, Helm received a life sentence without parole. Id. at 281-82. The Court held
that since Helm received the "penultimate" sentence for minor conduct, was treated more
harshly than criminals within the jurisdiciton who committed worse crimes, and was more
harshly treated than similar offenders in any other jurisdiction with the possible exception of
one state, his eighth amendment rights were violated. Id. at 303.
The facts in Solem mirror the current debate over the "Three Strikes and You're Out' laws.
Under California's scheme, Calif Penal Code § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1995), a violent or serious
felony conviction counts as strike one. J. Anthony Kline, Comment: The Politicalization of
Crime, 46 Hastings L. J. 1087, 1089 (1995). A second conviction counts as strike two and
warrants twice the sentence as that crime would otherwise warrant. Id. at 1089. A third
conviction, regardless of whether it is for a violent or serious crime, receives a life sentence with
a minimum term of the greater of (1) three times the sentence the crime would normally
receive; (2) twenty-five years; or (3) the term determined by the court for the new crime. Id.
The court does not have the discretion to consider the specific facts and circumstances surround-
ing a particular defendant's case. Loren L. Barr, The 'Three Strikes Dilemma":- Crime
Reduction at Any Price?, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 107, 132 (1995).
Because the third strike does not have to be a violent or serious crime, defendants who have
committed minor crimes are subject to life sentences. Crimes counting as strike three include:
stealing a piece of pizza, Victor S. Sze, Note, A Tale of Three Strikes: Slogan Triumphs Over
Substance as Our Bumper-Sticker Mentality Comes Home to Roost, 28 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1047,
1068-69 (1995); stealing two bicycles, Robin Clark, California's New "Three Strikes" Law Casts a
Very Wide Net for Two-Time Felons, Even Bicycle Theft Could Mean Life in Prison, Philadelphia
Inquirer at Al (May 10, 1994); and being found asleep behind the wheel of a stolen car. Id.
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In a recent decision, only two justices held that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause does not forbid disproportionate pun-
ishments, while seven reaffirmed the holding that it does. 127 These
seven justices disagreed over the actual standard for proportionality,
with three justices stating it is a "narrow" principle that only requires
evaluation of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty. 12 8 While this debate may reduce the Solem test to a single
factor, at a minimum the Court still requires proportionality.
Thus, although the Supreme Court has not established a test
solely for excessive fines, it has established a test for the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause. This test is just as workable if a fine is
at issue as when a prison sentence is challenged as cruel and
unusual. 129 The Court has read "cruel and unusual punishments" as
implicitly requiring what the Excessive Fines Clause requires
explicitly: proportionate or non-excessive punishment. Thus, while
the Court has not expressly stated a formula for excessive fines, logic
dictates that the Solem test for proportionate sentences applies to
fines as well. At the very least, proper analysis involves a comparison
of the harshness of the fine with the seriousness of the crime involved.
2. As Applied to Corporations
Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether corpora-
tions receive eighth amendment protection, corporations have suc-
cessfully challenged fines under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the
early twentieth century, the Supreme Court reviewed fines imposed
on corporations under the Due Process Clause. 130  These cases
Thus, like Helm, a defendant under a Three Strikes regime can receive a "penultimate" sen-
tence for minor crimes. Some California judges, perhaps noticing the similarity, have refused to
enforce the state's Three Strikes law. Rebecca Marcus, Racism in Our Courts: The
Underfunding of Public Defenders and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22
Hastings Const. L. Q. 219, 225 (1994). One judge declared the law unconstitutional because it
required "cruel and unusuar' jail terms. Id.
127. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 965 (1991).
128. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the Court has recognized a narrow
proportionality principle, whereby sentences grossly disproportionate to the crime violate the
Eighth Amendment). But see id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Kennedy for
looking at only one factor).
129. In the area of civil forfeitures, the Court has left it to the lower courts to develop a
method for evaluating proportionality. Austin 509 U.S. at 622-23.
130. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909); St. Louis Iron Mountain &
Southern Railway Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919). Although state power is supreme
in defining crimes and setting sentences, the states are limited by the Constitution, and one
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occurred in the early twentieth century before the Eighth Amendment
applied to the states.'
3 '
Under this line of cases, fines reasonably intended to assure
compliance with the law passed due process scrutiny.3 2 Yet the
Supreme Court distinguished fines as arbitrary and oppressive when
the corporate defendant acted neither recklessly nor intentionally and
did not depart from a known standard. Such a fine, the Court
reasoned, deprives the corporation of property without due process
and is a taking. 133 Thus, although the Court has not invoked the
Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause provided corporations
with protection from overbearing fines, at least at the turn of the
century. This use of due process suggests that corporations also
receive protection from such penalties under the Excessive Fines
Clause now that the Eighth Amendment applies to the states.
134
More recently, lower court decisions have involved challenges
under the Eighth Amendment itself. Courts often have dismissed
eighth amendment challenges in cases involving corporations on other
grounds without addressing whether the Eighth Amendment applies
to corporations. 135 The United States Court of International Trade
held that while a corporate defendant could not raise an eighth
amendment claim before a fine was actually imposed, it could raise
the issue after the government imposed a penalty. 36 A district court
found that a penalty in a qui tam action 137 did not correspond to the
level of culpable conduct committed by the corporate defendant and
therefore declared the penalty to be excessive under the Eighth
constitutional limit is the Due Process Clause. Coffee v. Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659, 662-63
(1907).
131. Browning, 492 U.S. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Since Robinson, the Court has
extended the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to the states. 370 U.S. at 667. The Court
has not articulated any reason why the amendment as a whole should not be applied.
Browning, 492 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. United States v. Clyde S.S. Co., 36 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1929).
133. Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490-91, (1915).
Some cases did not raise questions of excessive fines per se but concerned true procedural due
process violations, where a fine was so large that it appeared to have been established to
prevent persons from challenging it in court for fear of enormous liability. F.C. Henderson, Inc.
v. Railroad Commn'n of Texas, 56 F.2d 218, 223 (W.D. Tex. 1932).
134. Browning, 492 U.S. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. For example, United States v. Fleetwood Enterprises Inc., 689 F. Supp. 389, 392 (D.
Del. 1988) (finding the Eighth Amendment claim unripe); ABC Book, Inc. v. Benson, 315 F.
Supp. 695, 701-02 (M.D. Tenn. 1970) (denying a facial challenge to a statute); United States v.
Schechter Poultry Corp., 8 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) (finding the eighth amendment claim
unripe).
136. United States v. Valley Steel Products Co., 765 F. Supp. 752, 754 (Ct. Int. Trade 1991).
137. Defined as an action brought by an informer who receives part of the penalty with the




Amendment. 138 In another action, the First Circuit assumed that the
Eighth Amendment applied to corporations and proceeded to find that
the fine was not excessive. 139 These cases suggest that the Eighth
Amendment should apply to corporations.
Courts have also used a cruel and unusual punishments
analysis to evaluate fines. A three judge district court stated that
fines could be cruel and unusual, although in the case at bar, the
corporation had not received such a fine. 140 Another court dismissed
an eighth amendment claim as frivolous under the Solem test, finding
that the corporation had been convicted of a serious crime, that a fine
was used in lieu of incarceration, that the corporation was able to pay,
and that the fine was therefore not disproportionate to the crime
committed.14
Thus, although the Court has not applied the Eighth
Amendment to corporations, it has not found the amendment to be
inappropriate for corporations. The Court has provided the same
protection guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment using the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Also, lower courts have
examined Eighth Amendment claims without dismissing them on
grounds of corporate identity. These cases provide precedent for the
application of the Eighth Amendment to a defendant regardless of
identity.
IV. REASONS FOR APPLYING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO
CORPORATIONS
A. The Nature, History, and Purpose Analysis
The nature, history, and purpose analysis supports applying
the Eighth Amendment to corporations for three reasons. First,
courts can apply the amendment to corporations without destroying
the essence of the amendment. As Justice O'Connor reasoned, "the
payment of monetary penalties, unlike the ability to remain silent, is
138. United States Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co., Inc., 840 F. Supp 71, 74 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
139. U.S. v. Pilgrim Market Corp., 944 F.2d 14, 22 (lst Cir. 1991).
140. Whitney Stores, Inc. v. Summerford, 280 F. Supp. 406, 411 (D.S.C. 1968) (per curiam),
affd, 393 U.S. 9, 21 (1968).
141. United States v. Atlantic Disposal Serv., Inc., 887 F.2d 1208, 1209 (3d Cir. 1989).
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something that a corporation can do as an entity."142 The corporation
itself can pay a fine from corporate funds. In contrast, applying the
privilege against self-incrimination to corporations would stretch the
logic of the Fifth Amendment. Forcing a corporation to pay a fine
requires no leap in logic. Paying fines is possibly the portion of the
Bill of Rights that most easily translates to the corporate setting
43
because it clearly involves questions of property rights.
Second, the history of the amendment demonstrates that the
Framers intended it as a restraint on the government's prosecutorial
power. The identity of the defendant does not affect this purpose.
The history of the amendment could be interpreted as indicating that
only individuals are protected from the government, but such an in-
terpretation does not square with the holding in Bellotti. In Bellotti,
the Court expressly stated that the issue of whether the First
Amendment applies to corporations does not depend upon the identity
of the speaker, nor should corporate identity determine whether other
amendments apply.'" Interpreting the history of the Eighth
Amendment to support the proposition that only individuals are pro-
tected would violate the spirit of Bellotti by focusing on the identity of
the entity asserting eighth amendment rights. Every amendment
could be interpreted narrowly so as to protect only individuals.
However, such reasoning ignores the Court's post-1960 movement
away from drawing distinctions between natural persons and corpora-
tions as a means to decide which bill of rights protections apply to
corporations. 4
5
Third, the concerns of the Eighth Amendment are present in
the corporate world. The government does not pursue sanctions only
against individuals; just as corporations are considered persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment, they are considered persons under
criminal statutes as well. For instance, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") defines a person as "any
individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in
142. Browning, 492 U.S. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. For example, in Pilgrim Market Corp., the court cited the district court's finding that
repeated felony violations established that the corporation was not a good citizen and held that
the fine served the purpose of punishment and deterrence without being excessive in light of the
defendant's conduct. 944 F.2d at 22.
144. The Court stated that the value of political speech did not depend on the identity of
the speaker. 435 U.S. at 777. The Court distinguished cases that denied rights to corporations
on the grounds that they involved purely personal protections. Id. at 779 n.14 CWhether or not
a particular guarantee is 'purely personal' or is unavailable to corporations for some other
reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.").
See notes 57-74 and accompanying text.
145. Mayer, 41 Hastings L. J. at 620-21 (cited in note 14).
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property."'14 Since corporations are capable of holding property, they
are within the definition, and thus the courts have held that
corporations are persons under RICO. 147 In addition, the numerous
cases with corporations as defendants demonstrate that corporations
are persons subject to criminal and civil sanctions.148  Since a
corporation is subject to penalties under RICO and other statutes, it
stands to reason that the same limits on government power should
apply when the government prosecutes a corporation.
B. Application Does Not Distort the Bill of Rights
To some, allowing fictional entities to assert the same rights
for which patriots gave their lives tramples on the country's founding
principles.14 9 The average American might not understand how the
supreme law of the land equally protects conglomerates of capital and
breathing individuals.,' Extending the Eighth Amendment to
corporations, however, does not distort the Bill of Rights. Although
other amendments cover purely personal guarantees that are un-
available to corporations, 5' the Eighth Amendment, under the nature,
history, and purpose analysis established in Bellotti and discussed
above, does not.152 Applying the Eighth Amendment to corporations
merely fulfills the purposes of the Bill of Rights by treating all defen-
dants fairly instead of granting the government arbitrary power.
146. 18 U.S.C. §1961(3) (1994 ed.).
147. R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., 757 F. Supp. 1499, 1521 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
148. For example, United States v. R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1971); Atlantic
Disposal, 887 F.2d at 1209.
149. The Framers were concerned with corruption of the public virtue, which included a
fear of the evil that great wealth could produce. John S. Schockley and David A. Schultz, The
Political Philosophy of Campaign Finance Reform as Articulated in the Dissents in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 24 St. Mary's L. J. 165, 187-88 (1992). For example, Thomas
Jefferson, while calling for a bill of rights, did not advocate the interests of wealthy and power-
ful individuals and corporations. He preferred the virtuous life of rural farmers over the
corrupting ways of urban manufacturers. Id. at 188-89. In Jefferson's view, manufacturing in-
terests did not further public morality. Julian P. Boyd, ed., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
George Washington, (August 14, 1985) in 12 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1797-98 at 38
(1995). James Madison's writings also indicate he did not object to minimal restrictions on
private corporations that tried to influence public affairs. Schockley and Schultz, 24 St. Mary's
L. J. at 191 (cited in this note).
150. See Mayer, 41 Hastings L. J. at 655 (cited in note 14) (arguing that from the lay
perspective, it is hard to understand how the Bill of Rights protects corporations as persons).
151. See Part II (explaining that corporations do not have the privilege against self-in-
crimination nor do they have fourth amendment privacy rights).
152. See Part II; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14.
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In 1991 Congress recognized the need to treat corporations as
well as individual defendants fairly by establishing the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. 153 These guidelines provide
a system for selecting an appropriate fine that is just punishment for
the offense and that will deter the corporate defendant.,5 During the
hearings, the Sentencing Commission heard from those who believed
corporations should face tough criminal punishments such as proba-
tion and charter revocation, 155 and others who were concerned about
the Eighth Amendment and feared that tougher punishments would
drive corporations out of business.156 The final guidelines address
these concerns by considering the seriousness of the offense in order
to establish a base fine which is adjusted according to the corpora-
tion's culpability score.1 57 These factors mimic the Solem test for the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which focuses on whether
the punishment is proportionate to the offense committed.118 Thus,
the treatment of corporate defendants by federal courts comports with
the standards applicable to individuals. This similar treatment does
not distort the Bill of Rights, but rather fulfills its goals by eliminat-
ing arbitrary government power.
Some fear that extending rights and privileges to corporations
will allow them to usurp the liberties of individuals and control the
political process.1 59 However, this fear is unfounded when the Eighth
153. The Guidelines became law in November 1991. Ilene H. Nagel and Winthrop M.
Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical
Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 Wash. U. L. Q. 205, 208 (1993).
154. Id. at 210.
155. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, Hearing before the United
States Sentencing Commission at 11 (February 14, 1990) (statement of Carl J. Mayer, Hofqtra
Law School).
156. Id. at 75. (statement of Joseph diGenova, Defense Attorney's Advisory Group on
Organizational Sanctions).
157. Nagel and Swenson, 71 Wash. U. L. Q. at 233 (cited in note 153). The culpability score
evaluates the corporation's degree of fault. Id. at 235-36. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
represent a departure from the common law concept of respondeat superior, which ignored the
culpability of the corporate entity. Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 743, 796 (1992). The judge measures the corporation's
culpability by examining the organization's behavior. Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse, 71 Wash. L. Q. 329, 332 (1993). Having an
effective program to prevent and detect crime, voluntarily disclosing violations, and fully
cooperating with the government can reduce the score up to 95%. Id. If the corporation failed
to do such "good citizen" acts, and if high-level personnel were involved with, condoned, or were
willfully ignorant of the culpable activity, the base fine can be increased by as much as 400
percent. Id.
158. Solent, 463 U.S. at 290-91.
159. These critics view the natural consequences of extending rights to corporations as an
overrunning of individuals who are undoubtedly weaker. Schockley and Schultz argue that
those against limiting corporate contributions and independent expenditures for political candi-
dates "are defending the rights of corporations and the wealthy to continue to exercise those
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Amendment is at issue. Extending the Eighth Amendment to corpo-
rations does not decrease the protections that individuals receive.
The Eighth Amendment is a passive guaranty: while extending the
First Amendment to corporations endows them with a number of
positive privileges such as an opportunity to influence public opin-
ion,' 60 the Eighth Amendment only serves as a shield from govern-
ment abuse.
The Eighth Amendment's purpose of limiting the government's
prosecutorial power is accomplished whether a corporation or an
individual benefits. The government has no valid interest in over-
fining any person or entity. If a fine is excessive, the fine no longer
serves a valid purpose and the government has overstepped its le-
gitimacy. Applying the Eighth Amendment to corporations would
allow the goals behind legitimate prosecutions to remain intact, since
corporations will still be subject to fines that relate to corporate mis-
behavior. Only fines out of proportion to the offense would be cur-
tailed.
Another reason that extending protection to corporations does
not diminish individual rights is that a fine imposed on a corporation
does not only affect the fictional entity. The fiction of corporate per-
sonhood often leads to the misperception that individuals are not
affected by actions against corporations. The right of corporations to
'corrosive and distorting effects' upon our political process, moving us toward plutocracy rather
than democracy." Schockley and Schultz, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at 195 (cited in note 149) (referring
specifically to the Austin dissenters, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Scalia). Indeed, some
scholars advocate the increased government regulation of speech "in the public interest." David
M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 951, 1036 (1996). They
view the risk of suppression as small since the party likely to raise a first amendment claim is
not a representative of a persecuted minority view but rather a rich corporation or powerful
person. Id.
In his Bellotti concurrence, Chief Justice Burger noted the success of some media enter-
prises in using the corporate form to amass "vast wealth and power" and to engage in activities
that reach beyond publishing and broadcasting. 435 U.S. at 796. Chief Justice Burger also
noted the fears of those who feel that the existence of such vertically integrated conglomerates
means a powerful few have the ability to inform and shape public opinion. Id. at 797. The Chief
Justice cited Justice White's Bellotti dissent which voiced fears that corporations have an unfair
advantage in the political process. Id. at 796. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice
White's dissent, which stated, "[T]he special status of corporations has placed them in a position
to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the
economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral process." Id. at 809. Restricting
corporate political activity is an attempt to prevent corporations from gaining too much political
power. Id. Justice White added, "[t]he State need not permit its own creation to consume it."
Id.
160. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1974) (noting that
advocates of a right to reply to press criticism of candidates claim that enormously powerful
corporate newspaper chains could manipulate public opinion and the course of events).
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freedom from government abuse supports protection of individuals,
albeit indirectly. When the government fines a corporation, the fine
impacts the shareholders' property rights since corporate capital is
based on shareholder investments. Employees may also lose employ-
ment if the fine is so excessive that it forces the business to close. The
concern for shareholder property rights led to the establishment of
legal personhood in Santa Clara.161 Preventing the government from
trampling property rights is no less a concern today, and still furthers
the purposes of the Bill of Rights.
C. The Corporate Identity Analysis
If Chief Justice Rehnquist's view that the application of bill of
rights protections to corporations depended on questions of corporate
identity commanded the majority of the Court, the Eighth
Amendment would still apply to corporations. Historically, the Court
has not found it difficult to extend bill of rights protections that deal
with property interests to corporations under the corporate identity
analysis.162 It has denied only the rights that seem personal in nature
such as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
under the corporate identity analysis. 63  In contrast, corporations
have received protection from takings without disapproval, even from
Chief Justice Rehnquist.164
The Excessive Fines Clause protects property rights by
restricting what the government can seize. In this way, the clause
serves a function similar to that of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which protect against takings of property without due
process of law. Applied to corporations, the Eighth Amendment
would directly protect corporate-owned property, and as discussed in
the preceding subsection, would indirectly protect shareholder
property rights. Thus, even if the Court did not use the nature,
161. See Part II.
162. As discussed in Part II, the Court extended the Fourteenth Amendment to corpora-
tions when it viewed them as aggregations of individuals. In the years following Santa Clara,
the Court extended fifth amendment protection from takings to corporations. Sinyth, 169 U.S.
at 522.
163. The Court denied corporations the privilege against self-incrimination, Hale, 201 U.S.
at 74; Wilson, 221 U.S. at 376; and the fourth amendment right to privacy, Morton Salt, 338
U.S. at 651-52.
164. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (listing the rights recognized
as belonging to corporations, which include the protection of corporate property under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Id. at 824 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (stating
there is little doubt that a state-created corporation necessarily has protection from takings
without due process of law).
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history, and purpose analysis, the Eighth Amendment should still
apply to corporations.
D. Proportionate Fines Fulfill Complementary Goals
The government has a valid interest in deterring unacceptable
conduct and in making the penalty fit the offense committed. At the
same time, any penalties imposed on corporations should not be
designed to destroy them or make the corporate form of organization
unattractive, unless society desires to eliminate the corporate form in
favor of some other. In light of the fact that corporations appear to be
an accepted business form and are the predominate form of
organization,165 it appears that society has not made such a choice.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide a framework for
accomplishing both these interests.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated in light
of empirical research showing that sentences imposed on corporations
were less than the actual dollar loss caused by the offenses.166 Thus,
corporations realized a net gain for transgressing the law. The
research also showed that the public perceived white collar offenders
as receiving lesser sentences. 67 Further, social science supported this
perception.168 The Sentencing Commission sought to remedy these
165. Corporations occupy a substantial segment of the American economy. Meir Dan-
Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations, 13 (U. of California, 1986).
166. Nagel and Swenson, 71 Wash. U. L. Q. at 214-15 (cited in note 153). This research
covered fines imposed on corporations with the ability to pay the fines. Id. at 215.
167. Studies show white collar criminals receive long sentences only to have them sus-
pended for probation or result in parole. Patricia M. Jones, Note, Sentencing, 24 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 879, 879 (1987). The public perceives white collar crime as rising, Peter Binzen, Watch Out
for White Collar Crime, Corporate Directors are Warned, Philadelphia Inquirer at F2 (Oct. 30,
1985), and white collar criminals rarely receive jail time, Lauren A. Lundin, Sentencing Trends
in Environmental Law: An "Informed" Public Response, 5 Fordham Envir. L. J. 43, 59 (1993).
For instance, in the 1980s, Congress questioned why no General Electric or E.F. Hutton execu-
tives received jail time for perpetrating fraud, while a woman who shoplifted four sweaters
received a thirty day sentence. Aaron Epstein, Failure to Prosecute Executives in Hutton and
GE Cases is Assailed, Philadelphia Inquirer A2 (May 16, 1985). Hutton had pled guilty to 2,000
counts of fraud and paid $2 million in fines. When Did Hutton Execs Learn of Funds Ploy, San
Jose Mercury News 14D (June 19, 1985). House Judiciary Subcommittee Chairman William
Hughes (D., N.J.) stated, "[n]o individuals were prosecuted in this and there is a public percep-
tion that justice wasn't done." Id.
168. Nagel and Swenson, 71 Wash. U. L. Q. at 215-16 (cited in note 153). Studies sup-
ported the public's belief that white-collar crime costs society more than common crimes. John
Braithwaite, Challenging Just Desserts: Punishing the White Collar Criminals, 73 J. Crim. L. &
Criminol. 723, 743 (1982).
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problems through systematic guidelines 169 that set appropriate and
effective punishments.
170
The Sentencing Commission established a two-track system.
For corporations on either track, the Guidelines authorize courts to
require all appropriate steps to remedy the harm caused by criminal
conduct through restitution, remedial orders or probation, and com-
munity service that directly relates to the offense. 17, Under the first
set of guidelines, if the court finds that a criminal purpose was the
driving force behind the corporation, the court has the authority to set
a fine intended to divest a corporation of all of its net assets. 72 The
Sentencing Commission intended this measure to give courts the
power to eliminate criminal organizations. 73 A different set of guide-
lines applies to corporations that were not set up for criminal pur-
poses but nonetheless have broken laws. For these corporations, the
Guidelines prescribe a base fine that generally measures the serious-
ness of the offense. 174 The fine can be increased or lowered according
to the culpability score of the corporation.
75
The Guidelines demonstrate that corporations can be penalized
to achieve just punishment and deterrence through proportionate
fines while protecting the existence of corporations that benefit soci-
ety. 76 While a criminal organization may be destroyed, a more com-
plicated structure of fines is in place to punish and correct wrongdo-
169. Nagel and Swenson, 71 Wash. U. L. Q. at 217 (cited in note 153).
170. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 337 (West, 1995)
("USSG") ('This chapter is designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their
agents, taken together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for
organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting
criminal conduct.").
171. Id. at 343.
172. Id. § 8C1.1 at 345.
173. This penalty is the organizational equivalent of the death penalty. Moore, 34 Ariz. L.
Rev. at 781 (cited in note 157).
174. USSG § 8C2.4 at 350. The court determines the base fine by referencing a schedule of
crimes. Bucy, 71 Wash. L. Q. at 332 (cited in note 157).
175. See note 157. The culpability score is based on such factors as prior history of viola-
tions, willfully ignorant conduct, the presence of an effective program for preventing violations,
and self-reporting violations.
176. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines promote compliance with the law better than the
common law basis for corporate liability, respondeat superior. See Bucy, 71 Wash. L. Q. at 333-
34 (cited in note 157) (stating that respondeat superior creates liability for the corporation when
an agent commits a crime in any way linked to the agent's employment and does not consider
the culpability of the corporation itself). Unlike the common law, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines require proof of criminal intent, which promotes voluntary compliance. Id. at 336.
By adjusting the culpability score according to the corporation's behavior, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines provide incentive for following the law. In contrast, under respondeat
superior, a corporation can be liable for acts committed by an agent even though the corporation
has instructed its agents not to engage in such behavior.
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ing for corporations not set up for criminal purposes. The fines
authorized by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines can become
extremely high, but since they are based on the culpability of the
guilty corporation, they are not arbitrary or excessive. Such fines
police corporations without making the survival of generally law-
abiding corporations impossible. However, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines only apply to federal courts, and thus they are only a
partial protection. Applying the Eighth Amendment to the
corporations would provide complete protection from disproportionate
penalties.
E. Consistency and Clarity in the Rule of Law
The Eighth Amendment should apply to corporations to assure
consistency and clarity in the rule of law. First, not applying the
Eighth Amendment to corporations would make the law inconsistent,
since corporations received "eighth amendment" protection in early
decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment. 177 While the Supreme
Court did not begin protecting civil rights until much later,178 these
early cases asked whether the state had imposed too large of a
fine-the same issue the Eighth Amendment addresses.
Another reason the early fourteenth amendment cases provide
support for applying the Eighth Amendment is that even though
these decisions used a different amendment, they provided protection
to corporate defendants within the scope of the Eighth Amendment.
In certain contexts, the Fourteenth Amendment may cover more situ-
ations than does the Eighth Amendment. For example, the
Fourteenth Amendment covers prison conditions whether or not a
person is convicted, while the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause only applies to convicted persons. 79 Such a discrepancy does
not exist, however, for the Excessive Fines Clause. Eighth
amendment protection from excessive fines only applies to post-con-
viction or civil penalties.8 0 Likewise, the cases using the Fourteenth
Amendment addressed fines that had been imposed.
177. See notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
178. John E. Nowak, Essay on the Bill of Rights: The "Sixty Something"Anniversary of the
Bill of Rights, 1992 Univ. Ill. L. Rev. 445, 451-52, 455.
179. Riddle By and Through Brewster v. Innskeep, 675 F. Supp. 1153, 1159 (N.D. Ind.
1987). See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (stating that the history of the Eighth
Amendment shows it was intended to protect those convicted of crimes).
180. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
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Second, applying the Eighth Amendment to corporations also
promotes clarity in the law. Frequently, corporations are jointly
prosecuted with individuals in civil and criminal cases. 181 In practice,
the courts address the claims raised by the defendants without dis-
tinguishing the individuals from the corporate defendants. 18 - If the
Eighth Amendment did not apply, the court would have to evaluate a
fine for the individual under the Eighth Amendment but would be
forced to evaluate the fine imposed on the corporation under the Fifth
or Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The court would
consider the same issue of whether a fine was excessive as applied to
each defendant, but would separately label two identical discus-
sions.183 Separating the analysis would obfuscate the court's reason-
ing since the court would evaluate the fines as if the defendants had
raised different claims, when both have challenged what the Eighth
Amendment guards against-excessive fines. In contrast, a forthright
discussion of the Eighth Amendment would develop any distinctions
in how it applies to corporations and individuals rather than creating
the pretense that any differences in outcomes results from applying
the Eighth Amendment as opposed to the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPLYING THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT TO CORPORATIONS
The preceding discussion is not meant to imply that distinc-
tions between corporations and individuals have no relevance in set-
ting fines. Although the law refers to corporations as legal persons,
this concept of personhood does not mean courts can deter unaccept-
able corporate behavior by treating corporations and individuals
identically. By establishing a separate chapter for organizations, the
United States Sentencing Guidelines Commission recognized this
principle, but in other contexts, the law's ubiquitous references to
corporations as persons obscure the organizational properties that
distinguish corporations from individuals. I84 In cases involving corpo-
181. See, for example, Gilbert, 840 F. Supp. at 72; Toeplernan v. United States, 263 F.2d
697, 698 (4th Cir. 1959); Schechter Poultry, 8 F. Supp. at 140.
182. Gilbert, 840 F. Supp. at 72-74; Toeplentan, 263 F.2d at 698-700; Schecter Poultry, 8 F.
Supp. 140-42.
183. The court would ask whether the fine against the individual was excessive and ask
whether the fine against the corporation was so large as to violate due process.
184. Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations at 44 (cited in note 165). Unlike
individuals, corporations have the following properties: a fixed and perceptible structure,
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rations, courts can avoid this problem by allowing the distinctions
between corporations and individuals to influence the type of adjudi-
catory model that is used185 and by considering what level of fines will
induce corporate efforts to eradicate unlawful agent behavior.
18
First, as a general rule, courts should emphasize a regulatory
approach 87 over an arbitration method' 88 when dealing with corporate
parties. 89 Corporations, unlike individuals, do not have protectable
interests in dignity, autonomy, and respectful treatment. 90 While an
individual would object to sacrificing her rights to establish a long-
term beneficial rule for society,' 91 an organization has greater interest
in the future implications of a ruling. 92 A corporation has less at
stake in a single lawsuit, but more to lose from a negative ruling's
effect on its future transactions. 9 3  These differences between
individuals and corporations reveal that when dealing with corpora-
tions courts should engage in a more legislative style of decision-mak-
ing that considers policy-making for society, 94 rather than concentrat-
ing on the rights of the specific parties involved.
95
permanence, a focus on decision-making, large size, formality, complexity, and a functional,
goal-oriented existence. Id. at 31-36.
185. Id. at 123.
186. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J.
of Legal Stud. 833, 837 (1994).
187. A more regulatory style would mean taking into account policies as well as the argu-
ments for existing rights, de-emphasizing precedent justifications, becoming more active in
determining the interests, shaping the issues, and designing remedies, and considering the
various interests that the decision will affect. Dan-Cohen Rights, Persons, and Organizations at
157 (cited in note 165).
188. With an arbitration method, the court deals with events in the past and the actual
persons before the court, relies on precedent and the litigants' conceptions of the case as de-
scribed in the pleadings, motions, and briefs, and does not base its rulings on the socially opti-
mal decision. Id. at 137. These constraints result from concerns about the rights of those before
the court. Id. at 138. However, with a corporation, the courts decision, while specific to the
transaction at bar, is not specific to particular people. Id. at 139.
189. Id. at 139.
190. Id. at 66, 69, 141.
191. Id. at 140, 144.
192. Id. at 144.
193. Id. Unlike individuals, corporations exist in perpetuity, and thus the courts holding
will affect corporations for much longer. Most individuals are concerned about losing the
immediate suit, not about future transactions that involve the same issue. Id.
194. Id. at 139, 144. With an organization, a judge has a greater opportunity to make a
lasting impact. Id. at 133. Corporations are organized deliberately with an ability to change
their modes of operation, are permanent structures, and engage in repeat functions. Id. at 132.
Thus, a judge can influence future transactions of the corporations involved in the suit as well
as other corporations engaged in the same type of transaction.
195. Id. at 139.
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Second, when setting fines, courts should consider the realities
of how corporate crime occurs. 196 Corporations themselves do not
commit crimes. 197 Rather, corporate agents commit crimes and do so
for their own self-interests.98 The principle behind holding corpora-
tions liable for the crimes of their agents is that corporations will
sanction their agents. 99 In order for this effect to occur, the corpora-
tion must increase its spending on enforcement. 20 0  However, greater
enforcement expenditures also increase the chances that the govern-
ment will detect crimes. 201 If the expected cost of an increased prob-
ability of government detection is greater than the benefit of catching
the criminal agents, corporations will not spend more on enforce-
ment.2
02
Thus, effective fines should reflect the need to induce corpora-
tions to institute effective enforcement measures. 20 3 One method is to
allow mitigation for corporations that have effective monitoring pro-
grams.204  Such mitigation is part of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines20 5 but not an explicit part of state law provisions on sen-
tencing.206 Other suggestions for encouraging corporate enforcement
expenditures include eliminating liability for crimes committed by
agents if the corporation exercises due care by instituting an efficient
enforcement scheme, and granting corporations a use privilege so that
196. "Corporate crime is not analogous to individual crime." Arlen, 23 J. of Legal Stud. at
834 (cited in note 186).
197. At first glance, a corporation set up for criminal purposes looks like an exception, but
even in that case, individuals still actually commit the crimes.
198. Arlen, 23 J. of Legal Stud. at 834 (cited in note 186) The corporation may experience
incidental benefits, but the agent does not committ the crime for those benefits. Id.
199. Id. at 835.
200. Id. at 835-36.
201. Id. at 836. A corporation doubles its chances of being detected by implementing opti-
mal enforcement measures under vicarious liability. Id. at 844. Professor Arlen assumes that
corporations reveal crimes they detect to the government. Id. at 850. Even if corporations do
not report all the crimes they detect, they recognize that the government may find evidence of
crime on its own and subpoena the corporate records. Id. at 859. The records may provide
prosecutors with evidence against the corporation. Id.
202. Id. at 836.
203. See id. at 837 (stating the proper fine could be found by dividing the net social cost of
crime over the actual probability of detection, as determined by the corporation's enforcement
expenditures).
204. Id. at 839-40.
205. USSG §C2.5(f) at 353. However, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines may not mitigate
enough to encourage corporate effective enforcement. Arlen, 23 J. Legal Stud. at 840 (cited in
note 186). Even with mitigation under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a corporation may
face substantial liability, and no mitigation is available for some of the major corporate crimes




information a corporation discloses can be used to prosecute agents
but not the corporation.
20 7
The above discussion attempts to clarify the practical implica-
tions of extending eighth amendment protection to corporations.
Corporations should receive protection from excessive fines. However,
what is excessive varies according to the identity of the defendant.
Extending the Eighth Amendment to corporations does not translate
into imposing identical fines on individuals and corporations. Rather,
the real differences between individuals and corporations deserve
consideration when setting a fine and when deciding whether or not it
is excessive.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether using the old or current Supreme Court method for
determining what rights apply to corporations, the Eighth
Amendment should apply to corporations. Prior to 1960, the Court
pondered the difference between natural persons and fictional corpo-
rate persons. Using this analysis, the Court denied personal liberties
such as the privilege against self-incrimination, but extended bill of
rights protections that protected the property rights of shareholders.
The Excessive Fines Clause protects property rights by preventing the
government from imposing a greater penalty than is due.
Since 1960, the Court has focused on the amendment at issue
and ignored the corporate identity of the defendant. An examination
of the Excessive Fines Clause demonstrates that its nature, history,
and purpose support applying it to corporations. Application to corpo-
rations vindicates the Framers' intention of limiting the arbitrary use
of the government's prosecutorial power.
Further, concerns of distorting the individual rights emphasis
of the Bill of Rights do not outweigh the logical arguments for extend-
ing the Eighth Amendment to corporations. Preventing the govern-
ment from imposing excessive fines against corporations does not
diminish that same protection held by natural individuals because
corporations can only invoke the Eighth Amendment against the
207. Id. at 862, 865. A negligence-based scheme encourages corporations to increase
enforcement expenditures since they will escape liability by demonstrating due care. Id. at 862.
Similarly, a use privilege would encourage enforcement expenditures because the corporation
would not increase its chances of being found liable. Id. at 865.
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government acting as plaintiff or prosecutor. Corporations cannot
raise the Eighth Amendment as a defense against civil parties.
In addition, extending eighth amendment protections to cor-
porations will not obstruct the prosecution of corporations guilty of
violating the law. The government can punish illegal corporate activ-
ity without penalties that are disproportionate to the culpable con-
duct. Applying the Eighth Amendment to corporations allows the
continued deterrence and punishment of unlawful conduct while
sustaining the legitimacy of the justice system.
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